SP4 includes the Information Store patch for the Denial of
Service vulnerability detailed in our last EMO issue.
Navidad and BleBla viruses
Don't let your guard down with respect to Outlook viruses. Among
the latest ones making the rounds is one that runs automatically
when you open an HTML-format message.
Navidad -- known as TROJ_NAVIDAD.A, W32/Navidad@M, or W32/Navidad
-- is a fairly typical .exe attachment virus. If you don't run it,
you don't get infected. If you do get infected, then the virus will
run whenever you try to start any program that uses an .exe file. It
will also send a copy of itself by replying to messages in your
Outlook Inbox. Our standard recommendations at http://www.slipstick.com/outlook/antivirus.htm
easily protect against this type of virus.
The BleBla virus -- also known as Romeo & Juliet or
TROJ_BLEBLA.A -- is a different story. We think it's potentially
more dangerous than the anti-virus sites indicate. Why? Because, as
far as we know, it's the first virus in the wild to combine several
Internet Explorer and Windows vulnerabilities to deliver its payload
via an HTML mail message that can launch a malicious .exe file
automatically when you open the message.
Here's how BleBla works: It uses Iframe elements in the HTML
message to cause its two payload files, MYJULIET.CHM and MYROMEO.EXE,
to save into your Windows TEMP folder by way of two different
vulnerabilities. One in Iframe was first exposed more than six
months ago -- see http://www.ntsecurity.net/Articles/Index.cfm?ArticleID=9474
-- but we were unable to find any patch to fix it. The second, known
as the "Cache Bypass" vulnerability was fixed in July. See
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS00-046.asp
for details
A small script then runs the MYJULIET.CHM file, which in turn
launches the MYROMEO.EXE file -- the real payload. If you have
Outlook set up to never run scripts in HTML messages, the script
never executes -- so you're safe. More on that below.
The third vulnerability is not related directly to Internet
Explorer, but to Windows itself. Because the MYJULIET.CHM file has
been saved to the user's own TEMP folder, it can execute a shortcut
to another file, in this case the MYROMEO.EXE payload file. While
there is a patch to prevent HTML Help files (in other words, .chm
files) from executing shortcuts on remote systems (see http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS00-037.asp),
this fix does not keep a .chm file on the local drive from running
another file.
All this goes to show that virus writers continue to exploit
every weakness they can find. An anti-virus program is only as good
as its last update and the heuristics it uses to detect suspected
new viruses. Setting Outlook to never allow scripts to run in HTML
messages is a key defense against these types of viruses. If you
don't know whether you have Outlook set to never run scripts, we
urge you to follow these steps to put Outlook in the Restricted
Sites zone and make scripts inoperable in that zone:
- Use Tools | Options | Security to set the security zone
for Outlook HTML mail to Restricted Sites.
- Click the Zone Settings button, then OK.
- Select Custom, and then click the Settings button.
- On the Security Settings dialog box, choose Disable
for all options under these headings:
- ActiveX Controls and plugins
- Scripting
- Click OK three times to save the updated security
settings.
Installing the Outlook Email Security Update also restricts
scripts and blocks both .exe and .chm files, so it should offer good
protection against BleBla. However, this update is not for everyone,
since it also affects the way some key applications run. See http://www.slipstick.com/outlook/esecup.htm
for complete details.
Our thanks to Kaspersky Labs in Moscow (http://www.kaspersky.com)
for confirming the details of BleBla's behavior. Kaspersky's page on
the virus also notes that it seems to have a bug that apparently
keeps it from spreading on English-language Windows systems. This
may be why it has not propagated further and become a higher-risk
virus. Kaspersky also says that Internet Explorer 5.0 SP1, which
should have fixed the "Cache Bypass" vulnerability, still
was vulnerable to this issue in their tests. Internet Explorer 5.5,
on the other hand, did prevent the MYJULIET.CHM file from saving
into the TEMP folder.
Learning Exchange -- 12 weeks or 2?
I read an interesting article recently on "Learning a New
Messaging System" at http://www.cnilive.com/marketsite/ms001102.html.
Creative Networks, Inc., says their research shows that the average
time for administrators, help desk and other support staff to adapt
to a new Exchange Server installation is about 12 weeks. Large
organizations seem to take longer, CNI says, for a variety of
reasons, including all the complexities of migrating from one mail
system to another.
How many organizations moving to Exchange Server have been
prepared for 12 weeks of a less-than-optimal mail system? The CNI
study found that more than a quarter of organizations implement
Exchange were back to normal operations in less than two weeks. What
did they do that made their implementations so successful? Was it
better preparation or just fewer problems? I hope CNI continues
their analysis to answer some of these questions.